報告題目：Signaling Quality Information in Initial Coin Offerings with Fund Regulation

報告所屬學科：管理科學與工程

報告人：薛巍立（東南大學）

報告時間：2021年6月2日 14:00-17:00

報告地點：將軍路校區經管學院702室

報告摘要：

Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a new fund raising way based on blockchain technology. Under ICOs, ventures can issue tokens to investors to raise funds and promise that the future product can be paid only by tokens. However, quality information asymmetry and cash diversion risk are major issues in ICOs, which will lead to project failure for ventures. This paper considers how the fund regulation influence the venture’s signaling strategy and profits. Specifically, we consider two types of ventures producing high or low-quality products, respectively, and the quality information is privately known. Ventures should decide their token size for ICO stage and the token denominated price of the product. The token price is determined by market clearance condition. We show the conditions when separating and pooling equilibria exist and study when ventures will signal their quality information. For example, we find that ventures are more likely to target informed investors when fund regulation is loose and distort token size to achieve separating equilibrium when fund regulation is strict. Interestingly, we find that under complete information, a more strict fund regulation makes ventures more profitable, however, under information asymmetry, the fund regulation can hurt the venture’s profit and lead distorting separating disappears when token liquidity is low.

報告人簡介：

薛巍立，東南大學經濟管理學院教授、博導，東南大學“仲英青年學者”；中國自動化學會經濟與管理系統專業委員會會員，中國管理現代化研究會運作管理專業委員會會員等。 主要從事數字經濟環境下的運營與決策優化、供應鏈物流管理、服務運營管理等。發表SCI/SSCI論文40多篇，包括Management Science、Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、Decisioni Science、Transportation Science等國際知名期刊；主持了包括國家自然科學基金優秀青年科學基金在內的多項國家級和省部級項目。